Much progress has been achieved in the valuation of call options and interest-rate caps on default-free mortgages. The evidence suggests that the observed term structure of interest rates (the full structure, not just the end points) and a reasonable estimate of the volatility of spot rates is sufficient for pricing purposes. Knowledge of the precise nature of the interest-rate process and the exact market price of interest-rate risk, the not-wellidentified determinants of the term structure, are not necessary for pricing.
I. The Basics of Mortgage Pricing
Substantial similarity exists between fixed-rate mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) with interest rate caps and floors. Lenders will earn below-market returns on both instruments if interest rates should rise far more sharply than expected. Moreover, rate floors on ARMs and costly call of FRMs will cause lenders to earn above-market rates of return on both instruments should interest rates decline somewhat more than expected. Because of these similarities, the fundamental determinants of the spreads between coupon rates on par-value FRMs or ARMs and the short-term market rate of interest are the same.
This mortgage coupon mark-up is largely determined by the slope of the term structure of interest rates and the longer-run volatility in short-term rates. The more upward sloping is the term structure --the more lenders expect interest rates to rise and the more lenders are averse to increases in rates --the greater will be the mark-up on fixed or capped rate loans.
Moreover, even if the term structure is relatively flat, high long-run volatility in short rates (high short-term volatility and little mean reversion) means a reasonable likelihood of significantly higher interest rates during some future periods. Thus the higher is long-run rate volatility, the greater is the mark-up.
Setting looser rate caps on ARMs and introducing ARM rate floors and/or costly call modifies the relationship between the mark-up and its determinants.
The looser are the rate caps and the more costly is call or prepayment, the less the mark-up will be for a given slope of the term structure and level of long-run rate volatility. With loose caps, lenders lose less relative to market rates when rates rise; with costly call and/or rate floors, lenders gain relative to market rates when rates decline. How much the mark-up is reduced again varies with the slope of the term structure and the long-run volatility in rates. Pricing mortgages, then, depends crucially on the assumptions made regarding possible future interest-rate paths, as well as on the terms of the mortgage contract.
A. Modelling Interest Rates
In general, the interest-rate process is modelled in continuous time as a diffusion process about an expected drift over time. More formally, the change in the spot rate, dr, is the sum of a time drift term and a diffusion term:
where u is the value toward which the spot rate is reverting, with k being the speed of reversion, or5 is the standard deviation of the spot rate (a and are constants) and dz is a standardized Gauss-Weiner process (dz has independent increments that are normally distributed with a mean of zero and variance of dt). The dependency of the standard deviation on the level of interest rates prevents negative interest rates from occurring; an a less than unity or k greater than zero prevents rates from exploding. For a given specification of u (such as the long-term Treasury rate) and a (usually or unity), values of k and a can be obtained by the estimation of r u_r1 + OE r r t t-l t-l where is a random error and the equation standard error equals a (Brennan and Schwartz, 1982; Buser and Hendershott, 1984) . The estimates researchers obtain for mortgage mark-ups will depend crucially on the assumptions made about the drift (U and k) and volatility (are) of interest rates.
The current spot rate, r, is known at any point in time that one wishes to price mortgages, but the mean-reverting value, u, is not. The natural method of choosing u is to select a value consistent with the existing term structure of interest rates (Buser, Hendershott and Sanders, 1985) . If fixedrate mortgages are being priced, one might select the u that prices eight-year Treasuries correctly; if one-year adjustable rate mortgages are being priced, the u that prices one or two year Treasuries accurately might be chosen.
An alternative to working with this general diffusion process is to price directly off the yield curve (Crane and Lea, 1985) . To illustrate, the oneperiod yield one period out, r1, is expressed as the forward rate implied by the term structure, y1, plus a random error, cc
where a is again chosen to reflect the expected volatility in interest rates.
For two periods in the future,
The k term allows earlier random errors to have a persistent role over time.
With k = 0, strong reversion to the implied yield curve exists; assumed spot rates over time are those implied by the current yield curve plus the single random error:
That is, past errors also shift expected future spot rates from the value implied by the current yield curve.
B. Pricing Models
Using the interest-rate process given in (1) , with = and a zeroarbitrage risk/return condition, one can derive [Merton (1973) ] where the p's are the probabilities of the scenarios occurring if there is zero risk aversion (x= 0) and are the pseudo probabilities if aversion exists (Cox, Ross and Rubinstein, 1979) .
(Alternatively, one can calculate the present value of the mortgage payments, assuming no mark-up, for each interest rate scenario, average these, and then compute the mark-up that will raise this present value to par.)
The forward-solving model will provide incorrect results if (1) termination of the contract depends importantly on future values of the state-.
variable --the spot rate of interest in our case --and (2) if the current value of the contract depends importantly on when the contract might be terminated. This problem explains why the forward-solving model is popular in valuing ARMs but not FRMS. In the absence of rate floors, the call option on a short-term ARM has little value to the borrower and thus will cost the lender a negligible amount. All the borrower achieves by calling is a lower life-ofloan rate cap. A three percentage point decline in the ARM index, for example, converts what was originally a five-point life-of-loan cap to an eight-point cap. Because the gain from lowering the cap from eight to five is so small relative to the cost of refinancing, call is unlikely. but he gives up a valuable call option in the process (Siegel, 1984) . If the borrower did not call and interest rates were to fall by another two points, the borrower could then get a full 4½ point reduction in rate --which includes a pure gain of 2½ points over the 2 points needed to offset refinancing costs --in contrast to a half point pure gain if earlier refinancing had occurred.
In this case, one cannot accurately evaluate future events without knowing the likelihood of events even beyond. (The same problem exists in using forwardsolving models to price default risk: one cannot evaluate default probabilities in future periods without knowing the value of the unused default option, which depends on events even beyond.)
This problem can be finessed by reversing the direction from which the problem is attacked, i.e., by starting at the end of the contract, where the call option is known to be worthless, and working backward in time. For the partial differential equation (3) , one starts with a feasible array of, say, 50 spot rates at the end of the life of the fixed-rate contract and evaluates the -8-known final payment at each of these rates. One then computes the contract values one period back in time for each of the same spot rates, solving the differential equation using the "implicit-difference method" (Brennan and Schwartz, 1977) and the boundary values at the interest-rate extremes.
One of the low interest rate boundary values for a callable mortgage is the remaining book value of the mortgage plus the prepayment or refinancing penalty; call or prepayment occurs when the interest rate falls sufficiently for the contract to rise to this value. Should this value be reached, it replaces the original solution value. One progresses in this way back to the initial period. The mortgage value in the initial period at the spot rate known to exist at that time is the final solution. If this value differs from par, the mortgage contract can be altered (the C in equation 3) and the procedure repeated. (While the backward-solving can also be used in the Monte Carlo method, the calculations became exceedingly tedius. In effect, a different PAY stream must be pre-specified for every interest rate scenario.)
While the backward-solving method is ideal for fixed-rate mortgages, problems arise when it is applied to pricing different tranches of collateralized mortgage obligations or adjustable-rate mortgages with caps because the contract cash flows on these instruments depend on the unknown path of spot rates in earlier periods (the reverse of the problem of forward-solving when termination depends on the unknown path of interest rates in later periods). With an ARM life-of-loan rate cap, the problem is minor; only the amortization is unknown, given today's spot rate, and the valuation is insensitive to amortization extremes (linear being the most rapid and that with the coupon at the life-of-loan cap being the least: Buser, Hendershott and Sanders, 1985) .
With adjustment period rate caps or CMOs, neither forward nor backward solving is adequate. The solution to this dilemma is iteration -9--between backward and forward solving solutions. This is achieved by the introduction of a second state-variable to keep track of the sample path of interest rates Langetieg, 1984, and Kau et al, 1985) .
A major difficulty in these pricing methods is their complexity. Not only are the models difficult for researchers to implement (setting the boundary conditions is the most difficult task), but the output of the models is nearly impossible for users to verify. All researchers in this area must be 
II. Evidence on the Value of the Call Premium in FRMs
Dunn and McConnell (l98la, l981b) were the first to apply the backwardsolving model to fixed-rate default-free mortgages. (Asay, 1978 , applied the model to value the default option in fixed-rate mortgages.) They illustrated how the methodology developed by Brennan and Schwartz (1977) for nonamortizing bonds could be applied to amortizing 30-year mortgages and showed the general implications of amortization. Buser and Hendershott (1984) (Hendershott, Shilling and Villani, 1983) Cassidy (1983) and Dietrich et al (1983) estimated the value of a partial offset to the call option --the forced prepayment of the mortgage when the house is sold. Cassidy, using a forward pricing Monte Carlo simulation, computed the option to be worth 30 to 80 basis points, i.e., elimination of the due-on-sale option of lenders would raise coupons rates on nonassumable mortgages by that amount. Dietrich et al, solving the partial differential equation backwards, reported somewhat higher estimates, 50 to 100 basis points.
Intuitively, these values seem too high. First, unlike the call option, the due-of-sale option is likely to be exercised relatively late in the life of the mortgage and thus is worth relatively less in present value terms.
(Hendershott, Hu and Villani provide an example in which the value of assumability is worth only a quarter as much as the value of call, 1983, pp 139-141.) Second, due-on-sale can be exercised only if households actually sell their houses and many will expressly avoid selling in order to maintain a far below-market mortgage (Hendershott and Hu, 1982) . Thus one might expect due of sale to be worth not more than a fifth as much as the call option. With call being worth 100 to 250 basis points, due-on-sale should be worth 20 to 50 basis points at most.
A final methodological point. All of the cited studies using the partial differential equation method employed a single-state variable except Brennan and Schwartz (and Asay) . The latter argue that a second state-variable is necessary for pricing default-free contingent claims. However, our results (Buser, Hendershott and Sanders, 1986) show that the second-state variable has a negligible impact on mortgage prices, again as long as the term structure and interest rate volatility are held constant.
III. ARM Margins
Given the only recent popularity of ARMs, the volume of research of their pricing has been enormous. The published work, and it is only the tip of the iceburg, includes both forward-pricing Monte Carlo analyses by Asay (1984) and Lea (1985) and backward-pricing calculations by Buser, Hendershott and Sanders (1985) and Kau et al (1985) . The last row in the table reports 
IV. Conclusions
Much progress has been achieved in the valuation of call options and interest-rate caps on default-free mortgages. The evidence suggests that the observed term structure of interest rates (the full structure, not just the end points) and a reasonable estimate of the volatility of spot rates is sufficient for pricing purposes. Knowledge of the precise nature of the interest-rate process and the exact market price of interest-rate risk, the not-wellidentified determinants of the term structure, are not necessary for pricing.
(The analogy to pricing stock options is striking; there, knowledge of the observed stock price --and the present value of expected future dividends --and a reasonable estimate of the volatility of the stock price are sufficient to price the option.) Moreover, the number of interest-rate state variables is also of little import, again holding the term structure and rate volatility constant.
Pricing the mortgage default option, in contrast, is still in the embryonic stage. While our understanding of default has increased greatly in recent years (see Van Order, 1985 , for a discussion and references) , our pricing has not progressed far beyond Asay's original piece. The stochastic process analogous to the interest-rate process in valuing call is a house price process: if a house price declines sufficiently, default occurs. The observed house price, the present value of expected future "dividends" (rents), and the volatility of house prices is, in principle, sufficient to value default (again note the analogy to stock price options) . Unfortunately, rents are unknown, and no observable term-structure of expected future house-price inflation-rates exists from which to glean the division of expected housing returns between "dividends" and expected capital gains. Also, a series on the recent volatility of individual house prices is not readily available. Finally, measurement of the costs to defaulters and the losses of lenders/insurers when default occurs is far less straight-forward than is the case when call occurs or interest-rate caps are reached. (Here, an analogy can be drawn to the difficulties encountered in pricing the bankruptcy risk of firms.) Asay (1984) 40 Lea (1985) 12 44 
